Confidentiality of Criminal Records Privacy v. The Public Interest by Weinstein, David
Volume 22 Issue 6 Article 7 
1976 
Confidentiality of Criminal Records Privacy v. The Public Interest 
David Weinstein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Weinstein, Confidentiality of Criminal Records Privacy v. The Public Interest, 22 Vill. L. Rev. 1205 
(1976). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss6/7 
This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF CRIMINAL RECORDS
PRIVACY V. THE PUBLIC INTEREST
DAVID WEINSTEINt
Privacy and Criminal Records
Many people start with the assumption that the collection,
retention and disclosure of criminal records, especially records of
persons who have been arrested but not convicted, creates a
"problem." There is great uncertainty, however, as to what precisely
this problem is. One prevalent way of describing it is as a "privacy"
problem. Given the difficulty the courts and commentators have had
in defining privacy and its legal protection, by simply labeling the
problem as one of "privacy" one does not shed much light on it. In
reviewing comparatively recent United States Supreme Court
decisions, one finds that the "privacy" issue has received rather
strikingly different treatment. When governmental interference with
important aspects of family life has been contested, the Court has
used "privacy" arguments to uphold the freedom of a person to
prevent the conception of a child or to terminate a pregnancy once
conception has been achieved. The contraception 1 and abortion 2
cases rest on concepts of personal autonomy and freedom from
governmental interference in important aspects of personal and
family life.
When, however, one examines the Supreme Court's treatment of
data collection where "privacy" arguments have been raised, one
sees quite a different result. In Laird v. Tatum,3 the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to challenge, in court,
military data collection about their political activities. The substance
of the decision is that the mere collection of data does not, in and of
itself, give rise to a claim which the courts will recognize. As the
plaintiffs and the dissenting opinion explained, the only reason to
collect the data is to use it, and, in particular, to use it in a covert
way, so that the plaintiffs would never know of its use. Without the
right to challenge the data collection, the plaintiffs would, in
practice, have no ability to challenge the data use.
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Temple University; Consultant on
Criminal Justice Information Systems to the Pennsylvania Legislature and to the
state governments of Connecticut and Massachusetts; Consultant to the Confidential-
ity Committee of the Philadelphia Regional Planning Council of the Governor's
Justice Commission of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. B.A., Yale University,
1959; J.D., Harvard University, 1962.
1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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More recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Paul v. Davis4
held that the police could circulate an announcement that the
plaintiff was a known shoplifter, even though the prosecution for
shoplifting terminated in his favor. The Court said that the United
States Constitution does not protect one's reputation, which
allegedly was being injured by the police department's activities,
and, therefore, the plaintiff had no cause of action under the Federal
Civil Rights Act. The thrust of this and other opinions is that the
Supreme Court will protect certain kinds of behavior from govern-
mental intrusion, but it will not extend the same protection to
information about people.
A recent case, Whalen v. Roe,5 illustrates the striking difference
between the Supreme Court's protection of behavior and its
comparative lack of concern about the harmful effects of data
collection. In that case, the Court upheld a New York statute which
mandated reporting of the names of users of certain prescription
drugs to a computerized central state data bank. The plaintiffs
claimed that protection of their right to confidential medical
treatment extended to the collection of data about such treatment.
The Court did not agree and upheld the data collection.
Obviously, the Supreme Court can and does make mistakes, but
in this instance, the different protection given to behavior and to
information about that behavior, reflects a broader problem of
bringing data collection and use within the ambit of some "right to
privacy." The difficulty lies, in part, in the fact that it is not personal
autonomy but rather other interests which persons attempting to
restrict government handling of information are seeking to protect.
Information, as the Supreme Court acknowledged, is collected to
be used. That use frequently causes harm to people. There is no
question but that a person with a criminal record is, on the one
hand, denied important benefits and opportunities which are
available to other persons, and on the other, is subject to special
treatment or disabilities.6 Persons with criminal records have
difficulty in obtaining jobs, occupational licenses and even certain
government benefits, such as public housing. The denial of benefits
or opportunities is often rationalized on the basis of the criminal
record when there is reason to believe that other factors are at work.
4. 424 U.S. 692 (1976).
5. 97 S. Ct. 869 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2542, S. 2810, S. 2963 & S. 2964 Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at
826 (1974) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:C86/13/974 v.2) (Report of the Comm. to
Investigate the Effect of Police Arrest Records on Employment Opportunities in the
District of Columbia).
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Some courts have held discrimination on the basis of criminal
records is equivalent to discrimination on the basis of race because
minority group members are arrested more often than others in
urban areas. 7 Moreover, persons with criminal records are unusually
susceptible to the power of government. Not only do the law
enforcement agencies feel freer to deal with them than they would
with other citizens, but also persons with criminal records are
singled out for special attention. For example, when the call goes out
to "round up the usual suspects," those usual suspects are almost
always persons with past records. Even if the record is only one of
arrest and not conviction, criminal justice agencies as well as others
tend to treat the two types of records as equivalent.
Criminal System Use of Data
The criminal justice system has, on the other side of the coin,
ample justification for its need for data. Criminal justice agencies
need data for management purposes. That is to say, the agencies
have a substantial caseload which must be moved through the
system in an expeditious and intelligent way. Some of this
management data can be of a statistical nature; they show how the
bulk of cases is being handled. There is, however, even for
management purposes, the need to identify individuals and follow
them through the system, so that their particular cases can be
handled fairly and swiftly.'
Beyond the collection of this relatively innocuous data about the
identity of a person and where his or her case is in the system,
criminal justice agencies require more detailed and personal
information, so that a proper decision can be arrived at in disposing
of individual cases.9 For example, when a person is arrested, certain
identifying information is taken down. This information is of a
relatively "public" nature. It is the type of information that all of us
routinely give out in order to obtain some governmental service or
benefit. As a person moves through the criminal justice system,
however, the nature and extent of data collection changes. At the
bail decisionmaking stage, for example, a great deal of important
7. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Green v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). The problems presented by employment are
discussed in Note, Employment Discrimination - Title VII - Unlawful to Use
Conviction Records as an Absolute Bar to Employment, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 1251
(1976).
8. SJIS, State Judicial Information System, Technical Rep. No. 18, SEARCH
Group Inc., Sacramento, Cal. (1976).
9. See Final Report, Confidentiality Comm. of the Phila. Regional Planning
Council of the Governor's Justice Commission (April, 1976).
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personal information is obtained concerning one's family history,
financial status, employment, educational status, and the like. 10
As one moves along through the system, the pace of data
collection quickens. Diversion programs, presentence investigations,
probation reports, institutional histories, psychological and medical
reports, parole agent reports, and the like, begin to accumulate. If an
individual seeks or is provided with drug treatment, psychiatric care,
employment counseling and other rehabilitative programming, the
volume of data multiplies. In the end, criminal justice agencies have
compiled almost as complete a dossier about a person as one will
find anywhere in this society. When one adds information about
past criminal history to this collection and supplements it with
investigative and intelligence reports, and then places the whole
mass of data in a computer system, the subjects of the data and
other persons are rightly concerned.
Data Collection and Computerization
It is not entirely clear how much of this concern is a product of
data collection and how much is attributable to computerization.
There are three basic positions regarding the effects of automation of
data. Some feel that there are no additional risks created by
automation. Rather, the process of automation has merely drawn
attention to preexisting problems of data collection. A second school
of thought argues that automation creates no qualitatively different
problems, but rather makes the preexisting problems quantitatively
larger. The third position is that automation engenders qualitatively
different problems which demand entirely new approaches to their
solution, if any there be.
Adherents of the first and second schools of thought acknowl-
edge that conscious action should be taken to deal with problems
which either have not been addressed in the past or have grown to
proportions which now require additional treatment. The solutions
proposed are, however, comparatively conservative ones and focus,
mainly, on restricting disclosure of information. If the problem is too
much or too rapid dissemination, then a lid can be placed on the rate
of dissemination. One can even limit the disclosure of information
by "expunging" or "erasing" data; such information, presumably, no
longer being available for disclosure.
Those who see the problems of automation in qualitative terms
are faced with a more difficult problem. It is not only that certain
10. Much of this information, incidentally, is collected about persons, many of
whom will never be convicted of any crime or subjected to any penalty.
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inefficiencies in recordkeeping, which formerly provided protection,
have been removed, but also that the character of data and the
potential for use and abuse have changed. The "qualitativist"
position rests on a number of assumptions about power, personality
and information.
Among the qualitative changes they note are: new meanings
created by agglomeration of previously separate information; social
control through total data surveillance; use of new decisionmaking
techniques based on rapid manipulation of information; psychologi-
cal subservience of data subjects to the collectors; undue reliance on
the machine with a concommitant dehumanization of life. This list
could be multiplied and each item analyzed, in detail, if time
permitted. The important point for present purposes is that
qualitative effects, if any, result from the computerization of fairly
sensitive personal data. In order to combat them, fairly radical
solutions may be required. Simple nondisclosure and nonretention
policies are not enough.
Data Expungement
Various solutions have been proposed to the problems of
criminal justice data collection. The most basic type of solution is to
eliminate information. Elimination can be achieved at the outset by
simply prohibiting the collection of certain information. With some
possible limitations on police surveillance of certain constitutionally
protected political and educational activities, there have been few
judicially imposed limits on data collection. The attitude of the
Supreme Court in Laird v. Tatum" is typical.
If collection cannot or will not effectively be restricted, then one
can move to prevent the storage of data or its retention. This is the
thrust of various "expungement" statutes. The purpose of such
statutes is to eliminate previously collected information on the
occurrence of specified contingencies. A frequently cited contingency
is the disposition of a criminal case favorably to the accused. While
several state statutes 12 and a few court decisions 3 appear to require
expungement or erasure in some circumstances, one finds that their
practical effect is somewhat limited. A statute may, for example,
require expungement or erasure of certain arrest records or the
return of fingerprints and photographs upon an acquittal, but leaves
11. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
12. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.100 (Supp. 1977); 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 877.
13. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1967); Sullivan v.
Murphy, 380 F. Supp. 867, 869 (D.D.C. 1974); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 346,
487 P.2d 211, 218 (1971); Irani v. Dist. of Columbia, 272 A.2d 849, 851 (D.C. App. 1971).
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untouched and in place all of the other information about the
individual which has accumulated in the course of a criminal
proceeding.14 While there seems to be some recent judicial interest in
providing an expungement or erasure remedy, examination of the
cases indicates that the courts will generally order expungement, in
the absence of a statute, when there is a finding that the law
enforcement officers had no probable cause, whatsoever, to arrest
the accused person."5 Examination of the facts of these cases
indicates that the courts are acting only when there has been a fairly
significant abuse of official authority.16
The expungement, either by statute or judicial decision, creates
new problems. It requires, in effect, that history be rewritten, that
events be turned into nonevents, and it attempts to achieve this
anomalous result by eliminating a part of the information which has
accumulated in the course of a criminal proceeding. There are also
real disadvantages to expunging information. For example, the
accused person may want evidence of innocence to show to private
persons who have the arrest record but not the disposition
information. The missing information is also required for proper
recordkeeping and accounting. Beyond this, the information may be
an important link uncovering a pattern of corruption. Special
treatment can be effectively concealed by expunging records.
Restriction of Information
As a practical matter, less drastic solutions are preferred. One
common approach is to retain information, after acquittal or other
disposition favorable to the accused, but restrict its disclosure.
Statutes requiring or authorizing "sealing" of information take this
tack. Information is not literally "sealed" but rather is placed in a
special status which permits only limited disclosure to particular
persons under special circumstances. The information is there, but it
is also not there, so to speak. Sealing has some of the advantages of
expungement without all the disadvantages. Because of the
continued existence of the information it is, however, likely to be less
effective in achieving the main goal of removing the detrimental
affects of a criminal record.
Another related approach, more applicable to "soft" than "hard"
data, is to regulate the form in which information may be kept. If
14. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-90 (1960).
15. Commonwealth v. Rose, 370 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977); Commonwealth
v. Malone, 366 A.2d 584 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976); Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d
157 (1972) (dictum).
16. Cf. Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971), where an acquittal
on the merits was sufficient justification for judicially ordered expungement.
[VOL. 22: p. 11711210
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automation overcomes the inefficiencies of manual or nonautomated
record systems or creates qualitatively different problems, then one
can prohibit automation or limit the manner of automation. For
example, if criminal justice agencies collect sensitive psychological,
financial or family history information, then, in theory, one can
simply prohibit computerization of such information.
There are several difficulties with these solutions. First, they
assume that it is automation, and not data collection itself, which
creates the problem. By focusing on automation, more basic issues of
information gathering, governmental decisionmaking and control of
individual behavior are avoided. By defining the problem as one of
"privacy" which, in turn, is equated with improper disclosure of
information, one can postpone, indefinitely, an examination of the
appropriate role of government in controlling deviants and deviant
behavior - including our own.
A policy of total nonautomation at least has the merit of
eliminating a potential source of problems. Some, however, propose a
policy of "semiautomation" which recognizes that automation is
both useful and harmful. The utility is to be realized and the harm
avoided by computerization only if the computer system is dedicated
to a single agency's function and is physically separate from other
such systems. An array of small computer systems would, in this
view, be preferable to a large centralized system. Advocates of this
position rest their case on the unstated premise that readily
accessible information which can be collected from separate systems
to create a personal "dossier" is significantly different from the
same information already compiled in a centralized computer
system, the access to which is tightly restricted.
Inadequacy of Solutions
With today's computer technology, the practical differences
between these approaches to computerization are not too radical.
The noncomputerization faction has waged a largely ineffectual
struggle. It does not have the organized power and vested self-
interest of its opponents. Those with a stake in automation are
restrained largely by economics. If the cost of computerization falls,
then the remaining barriers will fall with it. So far, all the power is
one-sided. Even the attempt to limit the scope of computer systems is
unlikely to prevail in the face of technology which allows for easy
access by one computer system to data in other systems.
Not only do the proposed solutions have real weaknesses, but it
is also not entirely clear that most people want them to work. The
thrust of the solutions is the sacrifice of some purported public
1976-1977] 1211
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benefit to gain some purported private benefit. If the private
beneficiaries are actual or alleged criminals, and the public
beneficiaries are everyone else, then the perceived public benefit is
quite likely to prevail. The general public sees little or no connection
between collection and computerization of information about
"criminals" and its own "privacy" and related interests. The
immediate problem of controlling criminal behavior precludes
serious consideration of remote and uncertain consequences. If the
computer can be used to "fight crime," then the public is behind it.
Another problem with the proposed solutions is that they
address the "nonprivacy" problems only by indirection. If one
cannot get a job or a license or a benefit because of an arrest or
conviction record, and this is thought to be wrong, then the primary
problem is with the decisionmaking process. If decisionmakers
consider improper factors or discriminate against people because of
criminal records - or use such records as an excuse for other types
of discrimination - then the obvious answer is to readjust the
decision making process. This would require, however, that mean-
ingful legislation be enacted to eliminate the unintended collateral
consequences of an arrest or conviction. This, in turn, would require
a definition of which consequences are, in fact, "unintended." Upon
closer examination it might well be that most of the consequences of
an arrest are, in fact, intended. By focusing on data collection and
disclosure, one can avoid hard questions about how we ought to treat
people arrested or convicted of crimes. Since the facts of arrest and
prosecution are in the public domain and are regularly reported by
the press - we would hardly want it any other way - attempts to
manipulate the processes of data collection and disclosure without
squarely addressing problems of data use ignore certain harsh
realities.
If these were the only problems with data confidentiality
policies, then we might wholeheartedly endorse them as a useful, if
only partial, means of achieving the desired goals. Unfortunately,
data confidentiality carries with it the potential for great mischief.
As it is, the general public, even its elected representatives, can
control governmental bureaucracies only in the most limited way.
Public access to important facts is, in theory, essential to the
prevention of inefficiency and corruption. Confidentiality policies
can become the means by which the inefficient or the corrupt conceal
their behavior.
The strongest advocates of open access are the news media.
While their interest is, in part, selfish - access to information,
especially "inside" information, makes for good copy - they
forcefully argue that elimination or concealment of information is an
1212
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open invitation to inadequate performance or illegal behavior. The
press, however, acknowledges few formal limits on its own access to
publicly held information. Self-restraint and enlightened self-interest
are considered to be sufficient constraints on journalistic abuse of
information.
Conclusion
Compounding the difficulties of defining the problems and
planning solutions is the lack of reliable information about their
scope and behavioral consequences. The police, on the one hand,
allege that law enforcement efforts will fail if adequate information
is not readily accessible. In their own view, law enforcement
agencies always see a need for more information, with cost as the
only major constraint. Yet, we do not know what the consequences
would be if the legislature denied police officers access to informa-
tion about persons arrested but not convicted of crimes. What little
we know suggests that the consequences would not be nearly so
enormous as they represent.
On the other hand, we don't know what difference it would make
if persons arrested, or even convicted, for crimes could fully and
effectively conceal that fact. Some people might improve their
economic position, but how many and how much is impossible of
meaningful prediction. We cannot even begin to estimate, intelli-
gently, what the outcome would be if all criminal justice information
were freely available to anyone who wished to see it. The press
might be happy but relatively free access in the past hasn't done
much to eliminate corruption or improve efficiency. The subjects of
the information might be hurt, but perhaps not much more than
now.
With so little solid information about the direct - and none at
all about the indirect - consequences of data collection, computeri-
zation and the solutions to the problems they seem to present, each
person must, of necessity, fall back on a set of half-articulated
assumptions about governmental power, personal behavior, social
control and the like. As long as our ignorance is almost total, we can
expect wavering policies and analyses with, perhaps, some minor
variations on what we have now.
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